18 research outputs found

    Target Set Selection in Dense Graph Classes

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    In this paper we study the Target Set Selection problem from a parameterized complexity perspective. Here for a given graph and a threshold for each vertex the task is to find a set of vertices (called a target set) to activate at the beginning which activates the whole graph during the following iterative process. A vertex outside the active set becomes active if the number of so far activated vertices in its neighborhood is at least its threshold. We give two parameterized algorithms for a special case where each vertex has the threshold set to the half of its neighbors (the so called Majority Target Set Selection problem) for parameterizations by the neighborhood diversity and the twin cover number of the input graph. We complement these results from the negative side. We give a hardness proof for the Majority Target Set Selection problem when parameterized by (a restriction of) the modular-width - a natural generalization of both previous structural parameters. We show that the Target Set Selection problem parameterized by the neighborhood diversity when there is no restriction on the thresholds is W[1]-hard

    Integer Programming in Parameterized Complexity: Three Miniatures

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    Powerful results from the theory of integer programming have recently led to substantial advances in parameterized complexity. However, our perception is that, except for Lenstra\u27s algorithm for solving integer linear programming in fixed dimension, there is still little understanding in the parameterized complexity community of the strengths and limitations of the available tools. This is understandable: it is often difficult to infer exact runtimes or even the distinction between FPT and XP algorithms, and some knowledge is simply unwritten folklore in a different community. We wish to make a step in remedying this situation. To that end, we first provide an easy to navigate quick reference guide of integer programming algorithms from the perspective of parameterized complexity. Then, we show their applications in three case studies, obtaining FPT algorithms with runtime f(k) poly(n). We focus on: - Modeling: since the algorithmic results follow by applying existing algorithms to new models, we shift the focus from the complexity result to the modeling result, highlighting common patterns and tricks which are used. - Optimality program: after giving an FPT algorithm, we are interested in reducing the dependence on the parameter; we show which algorithms and tricks are often useful for speed-ups. - Minding the poly(n): reducing f(k) often has the unintended consequence of increasing poly(n); so we highlight the common trade-offs and show how to get the best of both worlds. Specifically, we consider graphs of bounded neighborhood diversity which are in a sense the simplest of dense graphs, and we show several FPT algorithms for Capacitated Dominating Set, Sum Coloring, and Max-q-Cut by modeling them as convex programs in fixed dimension, n-fold integer programs, bounded dual treewidth programs, and indefinite quadratic programs in fixed dimension

    Evaluating and Tuning n-fold Integer Programming

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    In recent years, algorithmic breakthroughs in stringology, computational social choice, scheduling, etc., were achieved by applying the theory of so-called n-fold integer programming. An n-fold integer program (IP) has a highly uniform block structured constraint matrix. Hemmecke, Onn, and Romanchuk [Math. Programming, 2013] showed an algorithm with runtime a^{O(rst + r^2s)} n^3, where a is the largest coefficient, r,s, and t are dimensions of blocks of the constraint matrix and n is the total dimension of the IP; thus, an algorithm efficient if the blocks are of small size and with small coefficients. The algorithm works by iteratively improving a feasible solution with augmenting steps, and n-fold IPs have the special property that augmenting steps are guaranteed to exist in a not-too-large neighborhood. However, this algorithm has never been implemented and evaluated. We have implemented the algorithm and learned the following along the way. The original algorithm is practically unusable, but we discover a series of improvements which make its evaluation possible. Crucially, we observe that a certain constant in the algorithm can be treated as a tuning parameter, which yields an efficient heuristic (essentially searching in a smaller-than-guaranteed neighborhood). Furthermore, the algorithm uses an overly expensive strategy to find a "best" step, while finding only an "approximatelly best" step is much cheaper, yet sufficient for quick convergence. Using this insight, we improve the asymptotic dependence on n from n^3 to n^2 log n which yields the currently asymptotically fastest algorithm for n-fold IP. Finally, we tested the behavior of the algorithm with various values of the tuning parameter and different strategies of finding improving steps. First, we show that decreasing the tuning parameter initially leads to an increased number of iterations needed for convergence and eventually to getting stuck in local optima, as expected. However, surprisingly small values of the parameter already exhibit good behavior. Second, our new strategy for finding "approximatelly best" steps wildly outperforms the original construction

    Parameterized Complexity of Fair Vertex Evaluation Problems

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    A prototypical graph problem is centered around a graph-theoretic property for a set of vertices and a solution to it is a set of vertices for which the desired property holds. The task is to decide whether, in the given graph, there exists a solution of a certain quality, where we use size as a quality measure. In this work, we are changing the measure to the fair measure (cf. Lin and Sahni [Li-Shin Lin and Sartaj Sahni, 1989]). The fair measure of a set of vertices S is (at most) k if the number of neighbors in the set S of any vertex (in the input graph) does not exceed k. One possible way to study graph problems is by defining the property in a certain logic. For a given objective, an evaluation problem is to find a set (of vertices) that simultaneously minimizes the assumed measure and satisfies an appropriate formula. More formally, we study the {MSO} Fair Vertex Evaluation, where the graph-theoretic property is described by an {MSO} formula. In the presented paper we show that there is an FPT algorithm for the {MSO} Fair Vertex Evaluation problem for formulas with one free variable parameterized by the twin cover number of the input graph and the size of the formula. One may define an extended variant of {MSO} Fair Vertex Evaluation for formulas with l free variables; here we measure a maximum number of neighbors in each of the l sets. However, such variant is {W[1]}-hard for parameter l even on graphs with twin cover one. Furthermore, we study the Fair Vertex Cover (Fair VC) problem. Fair VC is among the simplest problems with respect to the demanded property (i.e., the rest forms an edgeless graph). On the negative side, Fair VC is {W[1]}-hard when parameterized by both treedepth and feedback vertex set of the input graph. On the positive side, we provide an FPT algorithm for the parameter modular width

    Voting and Bribing in Single-Exponential Time

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    We introduce a general problem about bribery in voting systems. In the R-Multi-Bribery problem, the goal is to bribe a set of voters at minimum cost such that a desired candidate wins the manipulated election under the voting rule R. Voters assign prices for withdrawing their vote, for swapping the positions of two consecutive candidates in their preference order, and for perturbing their approval count for a candidate. As our main result, we show that R-Multi-Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable parameterized by the number of candidates for many natural voting rules R, including Kemeny rule, all scoring protocols, maximin rule, Bucklin rule, fallback rule, SP-AV, and any C1 rule. In particular, our result resolves the parameterized of R-Swap Bribery for all those voting rules, thereby solving a long-standing open problem and "Challenge #2" of the 9 Challenges in computational social choice by Bredereck et al. Further, our algorithm runs in single-exponential time for arbitrary cost; it thus improves the earlier double-exponential time algorithm by Dorn and Schlotter that is restricted to the unit-cost case for all scoring protocols, the maximin rule, and Bucklin rule

    Tight Complexity Lower Bounds for Integer Linear Programming with Few Constraints

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    We consider the ILP Feasibility problem: given an integer linear program {Ax=b,x0}\{Ax = b, x\geq 0\}, where AA is an integer matrix with kk rows and \ell columns and bb is a vector of kk integers, we ask whether there exists xNx\in\mathbb{N}^\ell that satisfies Ax=bAx = b. Our goal is to study the complexity of ILP Feasibility when both kk, the number of constraints (rows of AA), and A\|A\|_\infty, the largest absolute value in AA, are small. Papadimitriou [J. ACM, 1981] was the first to give a fixed-parameter algorithm for ILP Feasibility in this setting, with running time ((Ab)k)O(k2)\left((\|A\mid b\|_\infty) \cdot k\right)^{O(k^2)}. This was very recently improved by Eisenbrand and Weismantel [SODA 2018], who used the Steinitz lemma to design an algorithm with running time (kA)O(k)b2(k\|A\|_\infty)^{O(k)}\cdot \|b\|_\infty^2, and subsequently by Jansen and Rohwedder [2018] to O(kA)klogbO(k\|A\|_\infty)^{k}\cdot \log \|b\|_\infty. We prove that for {0,1}\{0,1\}-matrices AA, the dependency on kk is probably optimal: an algorithm with running time 2o(klogk)(+b)o(k)2^{o(k\log k)}\cdot (\ell+\|b\|_\infty)^{o(k)} would contradict ETH. This improves previous non-tight lower bounds of Fomin et al. [ESA 2018]. We then consider ILPs with many constraints, but structured in a shallow way. Precisely, we consider the dual treedepth of the matrix AA, which is the treedepth of the graph over the rows of AA, with two rows adjacent if in some column they both contain a non-zero entry. It was recently shown by Kouteck\'{y} et al. [ICALP 2018] that ILP Feasibility can be solved in time A2O(td(A))(k++logb)O(1)\|A\|_\infty^{2^{O(td(A))}}\cdot (k+\ell+\log \|b\|_\infty)^{O(1)}. We present a streamlined proof of this fact and prove optimality: even assuming that all entries of AA and bb are in {1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}, the existence of an algorithm with running time 22o(td(A))(k+)O(1)2^{2^{o(td(A))}}\cdot (k+\ell)^{O(1)} would contradict ETH.Comment: Added Corollary 2, extended Conclusion

    Parameterized Complexity of Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists Through the Lens of Graph Parameters

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    We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well as on the side of fixed-parameter tractability. Other than for its famous sister problem Stable Marriage which focuses on a bipartite scenario, Stable Roommates with Incomplete Lists allows for arbitrary acceptability graphs whose edges specify the possible matchings of each two agents (agents are represented by graph vertices). Herein, incomplete lists and ties reflect the fact that in realistic application scenarios the agents cannot bring all other agents into a linear order. Among our main contributions is to show that it is W[1]-hard to compute a maximum-cardinality stable matching for acceptability graphs of bounded treedepth, bounded tree-cut width, and bounded feedback vertex number (these are each time the respective parameters). However, if we "only" ask for perfect stable matchings or the mere existence of a stable matching, then we obtain fixed-parameter tractability with respect to tree-cut width but not with respect to treedepth. On the positive side, we also provide fixed-parameter tractability results for the parameter feedback edge set number

    Maximizing Social Welfare in Score-Based Social Distance Games

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    Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance games where the utility function us̃ depends on a generic scoring vectors̃, which may be customized to match the specifics of each individual application scenario. As our main technical contribution, we establish the tractability of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning of the agents into coalitions on tree-like networks, for every score-based function us̃. We provide more efficient algorithms when dealing with specific choices of us̃ or simpler networks, and also extend all of these results to computing coalitions that are Nash stable or individually rational. We view these results as a further strong indication of the usefulness of the proposed score-based utility function: even on very simple networks, the problem of computing a welfare-maximizing partitioning into coalitions remains open for the originally considered canonical function u

    Complexity of the Steiner Network Problem with Respect to the Number of Terminals

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    In the Directed Steiner Network problem we are given an arc-weighted digraph G, a set of terminals T subseteq V(G) with |T|=q, and an (unweighted) directed request graph R with V(R)=T. Our task is to output a subgraph H subseteq G of the minimum cost such that there is a directed path from s to t in H for all st in A(R). It is known that the problem can be solved in time |V(G)|^{O(|A(R)|)} [Feldman and Ruhl, SIAM J. Comput. 2006] and cannot be solved in time |V(G)|^{o(|A(R)|)} even if G is planar, unless the Exponential-Time Hypothesis (ETH) fails [Chitnis et al., SODA 2014]. However, the reduction (and other reductions showing hardness of the problem) only shows that the problem cannot be solved in time |V(G)|^{o(q)}, unless ETH fails. Therefore, there is a significant gap in the complexity with respect to q in the exponent. We show that Directed Steiner Network is solvable in time f(q)* |V(G)|^{O(c_g * q)}, where c_g is a constant depending solely on the genus of G and f is a computable function. We complement this result by showing that there is no f(q)* |V(G)|^{o(q^2/ log q)} algorithm for any function f for the problem on general graphs, unless ETH fails

    A Unifying Framework for Manipulation Problems

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    Manipulation models for electoral systems are a core research theme in social choice theory; they include bribery (unweighted, weighted, swap, shift, ...), control (by adding or deleting voters or candidates), lobbying in referenda and others. We develop a unifying framework for manipulation models with few types of people, one of the most commonly studied scenarios. A critical insight of our framework is to separate the descriptive complexity of the voting rule R from the number of types of people. This allows us to finally settle the computational complexity of R-Swap Bribery, one of the most fundamental manipulation problems. In particular, we prove that R-Swap Bribery is fixed-parameter tractable when R is Dodgson's rule and Young's rule, when parameterized by the number of candidates. This way, we resolve a long-standing open question from 2007 which was explicitly asked by Faliszewski et al. [JAIR 40, 2011]. Our algorithms reveal that the true hardness of bribery problems often stems from the complexity of the voting rules. On one hand, we give a fixed-parameter algorithm parameterized by number of types of people for complex voting rules. Thus, we reveal that R-Swap Bribery with Dodgson's rule is much harder than with Condorcet's rule, which can be expressed by a conjunction of linear inequalities, while Dodson's rule requires quantifier alternation and a bounded number of disjunctions of linear systems. On the other hand, we give an algorithm for quantifier-free voting rules which is parameterized only by the number of conjunctions of the voting rule and runs in time polynomial in the number of types of people. This way, our framework explains why Shift Bribery is polynomial-time solvable for the plurality voting rule, making explicit that the rule is simple in that it can be expressed with a single linear inequality, and that the number of voter types is polynomial.Comment: 15 pages, accepted to AAMAS 201
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